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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
PROPERTY: A DEBATE
Joseph L. Sax*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than half a century the United States Supreme Court virtually ignored claims that regulatory enactments constituted takings of

property. In that atmosphere, it was inevitable that regulatory excess
would occur and that the Court would eventually again turn its attention
to the takings issue. Indeed, it was Justice William Brennan, one of the
leaders of the Court's liberal wing, who in 1981 opened the way to restoring property issues to the constitutional agenda.' By 1987, with a new
conservative majority in place, the Court made clear that it was preparing to take a fresh look at the constitutional law of property rights.2

II.

THE SETTING: LUCAS V SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL

The case the Court chose as its instrument was Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.3 In 1986, David H. Lucas bought two shoreline
* James H. House and Hiram H. Hurd Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California, Berkeley; A.B., 1957, Harvard College; J.D., 1959, University of
Chicago.
1. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), Justice
Brennan dissented from the majority's unwillingness to decide the temporary takings issue,
saying "[a]fter all, if a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner." Iad at
661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was shocked by the advice given by one
city attorney to his colleagues, discussing regulations challenged for unconstitutionality: "IF
ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START ALL OVER
AGAIN..... 'See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and
still win the war."' Id at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting James Longtin, Avoiding
andDefending ConstitutionalAttacks on Land Use Regulations (IncludingInverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO MuN. L. REv. 175, 192-93 (1975)).
2. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). Though Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (5-4 decision), was decided against
the property owner, the closeness of the case and the vigor of the dissent only underlined the
Court's new concern about property. Two members of the Keystone majority, Justices Marshall and Brennan, no longer sit on the Court.
An earlier decision signalled the Court's willingness to examine this issue. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). At the time of the debate from which this Essay is drawn,
Lucas had been briefed and orally argued, but not decided. I have retained the general format
of the debate here, not incorporating ideas drawn from the Court's subsequent opinion. An
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lots on a barrier island known as the Isle of Palms.' At that time it
would have been lawful for him to build a house on the landward portion
of each lot, though parts of his land had been regulated as within a criti-

cal coastal zone since 1977.1 In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act under which new setback lines were established,

and no construction of habitable structures was permitted seaward of the
setback line.6 The setback line was established landward of Lucas's lots
so that all of his property was within the newly established no-construc-

tion zone.' The island had a history of severe episodic erosion. Lucas's
lots had been entirely underwater as recently as 1963, and in 1973 a pond

formed over a portion of the lots, though they were not under water in
the 1980s.9
Lucas claimed the 1988 law took his property without compensation. The trial court made a factual finding that Lucas's land had been
made valueless by the enactment." The South Carolina Supreme Court,

assuming without deciding the factual correctness of the finding on diminution of value, held that the building restriction was a lawful exercise of

the state's police power and did not constitute a taking for which compensation was constitutionally required, regardless of the extent of dimi11
nution in the value of the land.

Lucas did not challenge either the reasonableness or the validity of
the law. The central argument he presented to the Supreme Court was

that no matter what harm building a structure on his land would cause,
analysis of the decision itself will be the subject of a second presentation and a second Essay in
this Review.
The Court granted review of several potentially significant property cases in the 1991
Term, but only Lucas led to a major discussion of the takings doctrine. See Yee v. City of
Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Romein v. General Motors Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992);
PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991),
cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992); see also Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento,
941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that city ordinance conditioning nonresidential building
permit on payment of fee to offset burdens caused by low-income workers employed on project
was not unconstitutional taking), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992). I have omitted the
discussion of Yee that took place in the debate because of the Court's very limited disposition
of that case.
4. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2887.
5. Id. at 2889.
6. Beachfront Management Act (BMA), 1988 S.C. Acts 634, amended by 1990 S.C. Acts
607 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
7. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
8. Id. at 2905.
9. Ia
10. Id at 2887.
11. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
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assuming it is the only economically viable use of the land, the owner has
a constitutionally protected property right to do that harm, or to be compensated.12 Justice Scalia identified the extraordinary nature of Lucas's
primary claim with a question he posed at the oral argument: "Scalia
then asked if the state should be made to pay even if its action is to save a
city."13 "If the land had value before and you take it away, then it's a
taking, [Lucas's attorney] replied." 14
Lucas wanted to prevail solely on the claim that a total diminution
of value was a compensable taking, no matter what the circumstances.
However, there was also a good deal of debate about the purposes and
needfulness of the law.
The South Carolina statute is by no means a model of clarity, but it
certainly was not simply an effort to make beaches more attractive to
tourists by demanding that landowners maintain their shoreline land in
its natural state, as some critics have.charged." Among other things, the
law states that it was designed to "protect life and property" including
"adjacent property."' 6 It was calculated to achieve those results by requiring maintenance of a buffer against storms such as the hurricanes
that periodically cause devastating damage along the Atlantic Coast.
The law also was structured as a response to risks to third parties created
when disaster relief is provided as part of post-storm emergency management. In addition the statute states that other erosion control devices
had "not proven effective" and .that it was adopting measures for existing
structures as well as undeveloped land, to phase out ineffective measures
over time and to encourage a policy of retreating back from the unstable
coastal area. 7 Among the several goals stated in the law, these-protection of life (at least lives other than those of the regulated owners), adjacent property and facilitation of disaster relief-are all directed to
avoidance of adverse external impacts anticipated from development of
the land being regulated. The law seems strongly focused on the risks of
storm disaster, and was enacted to limit the external harms caused when
12. See Arguments Before the Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3609, 3610 (U.S. March 10, 1992).
13. Id.
14. IM "But [the attorney] said his 'fallback' position would recognize a 'public necessity'
exception to the economically viable use rule. But that exception is not implicated here, he
said." Id,The public necessity exception to which he referred is the extremely rare sort of
case in which a building is destroyed by a city to prevent the spread of fire. See Bowditch v.
Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879), cited in Petitioner's Brief at 43, Lucas (No. 91-453).
15. The background of the Act is set out in Respondent's Brief at 28-35, Lucas (No. 91453); see also Brief of Nueces County Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
4-15, Lucas (No. 91-453).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(1)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
17. Id. §§ 48-39-250 to -280 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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violent natural forces strike developed barrier beach lands such as those
where Lucas's tracts were located.
The South Carolina law followed scholarly and government studies
that pointed to serious harms from precisely the sort of construction prohibited in the Lucas case.18 Hurricanes and storms cause man-made
structures to be broken apart and these parts become projectiles that are
carried by wind and wave, creating significant peril to nearby construction-which occurred on this very shoreland during Hurricane Hugo in
1989-and impeding the work of public emergency services. 19 Storms on
barrier islands raise the water table and lead to failure of septic and
wastewater systems. Sewer lines and septic tanks for near shore homes
are often severed or uncovered, causing contamination of coastal waters
and shellfish beds.
Building in storm hazard areas also imposes costs on the public for
disaster relief. It is not simply a matter of risks one takes that his or her
own property may be destroyed. Others beside the owners come into
developed areas, and they are put at risk in times of natural disasters. In
evacuating individuals, rescue workers must contend with downed power
lines and dangerous debris; they too are put at risk.
Undoubtedly, achieving the goal of storm damage minimization also
enhances a community's attractiveness as a tourist destination. Disasters
discourage tourists, as San Francisco found after its earthquake in 1989.
But the fact that tourism will benefit and is important to the state does
not diminish the law's other health and safety purposes. That the state
did not require preexisting houses on the beach to be torn down, another
fact that critics cited, does not support the claim that there must not
have been a very serious danger to the public. It is very common to
make regulations-even of the most serious hazards such as earthquake
and fire-prospective only. Such grandfathering is a well-accepted form
of concern for owners with existing investments, even though it represents a failure to impose full, or fully symmetrical, control of hazards.2"
18. Brief of Nueces County Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8-9,
Lucas (No. 91-453).
19. John R. Nolon, High Court's 'Lucas' Decision Leaves Shifting Sands in Regulatory
Takings Law, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1992, at 1, 8.
20. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1976); cf. Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (sustaining differential property taxes on old and new residents,
which disproportionately favor longtime property owners in inflationary market, as stabilizing
neighborhoods and recognizing longtime owners' greater reliance interest, as against equal
protection claim).
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THE QUESTIONS THE SUPREME COURT WANTED TO RAISE

The interesting question that the grant of review in Lucas was no
doubt meant to pose was whether the regulatory history of recent decades calls either for a significant shift in takings doctrine or for a significantly expanded judicial role in reviewing legislative judgments about the
propriety of regulation. I believe that neither change is called for.
Indisputably, the Takings Clause is about government abuse of
power. As my description of the case reveals, however, I doubt that Lucas itself involved such an abuse. The Takings Clause does require judicial review of regulatory government action, but it does not require any
major restructuring of takings law. A sensible implementation of a proportionality principle-assuring that there be a fit between the problem
and the remedy-answers most regulatory excess aspects of the takings
problem.2 1 Is the remedy the government has chosen proportional to the
problem created by regulated use of property? The more far-reaching a
regulation's impact on a property owner, the more serious the problem
that gave rise to it must be to meet a test of proportionality. But proportionality is simply a commonsense precept of rational governance. Its
demands fall far short of claims asserted by Lucas and his allies-those
of absolute right of use regardless of the gravity of the problem presented
by use, or the constitutionalization of the law of nuisance.
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

How extensive should judicial review of the propriety and proportionality of regulation be? There is no pat answer to such a question. It
is in part a question of judicial activism, of the appropriate degree of
judicial deference to legislative judgments. Certainly the same scope of
judicial inquiry is not appropriate to all constitutional rights-such as
property and First Amendment rights.
In areas like free speech and religion, the fundamental premise is
that government should stay out. In such areas, more extensive judicial
scrutiny of legislative action is warranted. The First Amendment says
"Congress shall make no law" respecting an establishment of religion, or
21. That is where most modem controversy is centered. There is relatively little dispute
over the most traditional forms of takings, in which the government appropriates property to
its own use, invades exclusivity by opening private property to public use, or trenches on the
equal protection element of takings jurisprudence by selecting out one owner for discriminatory treatment. Of course there are blurred lines at the edges of all these categories. See
Zygmunt J.B. Platter, The TakingsIssue in a NaturalSetting: Floodings and the Police Power,
52 TEx. L. REv. 201, 243-56 (1974).
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abridging freedom of speech, press or assembly.22 No such language appears in the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause. Indeed, the Constitution expressly authorizes legislation in the economic sphere, in
bankruptcy, in patent and in copyright.23 The legislative role is not just
that of a private individual. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment preserves
the police power of the states,24 which was never limited to the law of
nuisance, private or public.
Government must make laws about property, laws that demand innumerable and detailed judgments on many issues. Must tenement owners install fire sprinders? At what age should a minor's contract be
voidable? Do property lines move with shoreline accretion? Are spite
fences enjoinable? Shall we have negligence or strict liability; riparian
rights or prior appropriation, or both? On all such matters legislative
judgment is both appropriate and necessary, disputable and, over time,
variable.
The more intense the level of judicial scrutiny, the more courts are
called on to have the last word on all the many questions of judgment
that necessarily attend legislation relating to economic relations. To significantly raise the standard of judicial scrutiny is effectively to trivialize
the police power as a legislative matter, to reduce the state to a litigant
that must demonstrate, case by case, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the needfulness of its judgments. One can imagine the state having to
justify its fire safety standards building by building, with application to
each requiring proof in regard to the particular construction and status
of each building. The world would not collapse under such a regime, but
neither is there reason to be confident that a judiciary restricting legislative judgment so closely would produce even a minimally appropriate
level of protection against fire, flood and disease.
State courts have long rejected any such judicial constraints on legislative judgments.2 5 The United States Supreme Court ruled similarly in
the landmark Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2 6 case three-quarters
of a century ago when it held that land use regulation could be effected
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of the amendment states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Id
23. Id. art. I, § 8.
24. See id amend. X.
25. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 104 (1851) ("The reason
why it is necessary to have a certain and authoritative law, is shown by the difficulty, not to say
impracticability, of inquiring and deciding as a fact, in each particular case, whether a certain
erection in tide water is a nuisance at common law or not ..
26. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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by legislation of general application.27 The essence of the decision was
that the legislature, in exercising the police power, was not to be treated
by the courts as if it were simply a plaintiff in a nuisance case, bearing the
same sort of specific burden of proof as to every property affected by its
regulation. In speaking of the role of the judiciary in Euclid, Justice
Sutherland observed:
If these reasons... do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound
policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.28
To be sure, just because courts have held a certain view (like that in
Euclid or Alger) for a long time does not prove that their judgment is
correct. But in thinking about how a constitutional provision ought to be
interpreted, the judiciary's considered judgments that have endured over
many decades ought to carry considerable weight.
V.

THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS

A primary argument made in amici briefs on Lucas's behalf was that

unless the harm threatened was a nuisance at common law, uncompensated regulation that left his land without economic potential was imper-

missible.2 9 For at least a century it has been the law that the takings test
does not turn on the presence of conduct that had been a nuisance at
common law,3 0 and this should continue to be the law. Even assuming,
27. Id at 397.
28. Id at 395.
29. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-23,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), reprintedin 25 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1233, 1245-50 (1992).
30. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). I am unaware of any earlier case that
establishes a different test. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851)
(holding that issue was whether wharf violated statutory limit, not whether wharf was common-law nuisance). Professor Richard Epstein, in his brief in Lucas, gives no justification for
such a position beyond the following statement, which strikes me as casting little if any light
on the matter: "It might," he says, "seem odd at first blush that the limits of state power to
regulate could be determined, even in part, by the common law conceptions of nuisance that
have been developed over the centuries in such radically different contexts." Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, Lucas, reprintedin 25 Loy.
L.A. L. RFv.at 1245 (1992). Indeed it does seem odd. He purports to explain away the
oddity with the following statement: "But the intimate historical connection between the law
of nuisance and the proper scope of the police power remains in principle as vital and impor-
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for purposes of argument, that the content of "common-law nuisance' is
a relatively clear and identifiable category,3 1 there is a compelling reason
not to adopt any such test. 2
The reason is this: A nuisance at common law is simply a use of
property that, at some time in the (presumably rather distant) past, was
considered as imposing an intolerable harm on other owners or the public. The nuisance standard of any historic moment reflects the public
values and the state of scientific knowledge of its time; its content in 1890
differs from that of both 1990 and 1790. As the Supreme Court observed
in the Euclid case:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.... In a changing world it is impossible that it should be
otherwise.33
Undoubtedly, construction on barrier beaches was not a commonlaw nuisance at some historic moment in the past, both because its consequences were not known and because the types and levels of development
of our time were not a problem. Nor was construction on earthquake
faults or unstable hillsides a common-law nuisance. But I am prepared
to rest my case on the propriety of prohibiting construction on top of
earthquake faults-or slide area - or precarious barrier beaches-as an
entirely appropriate and non-compensable exercise of governmental
power; even if such regulation devalues entirely a particular owner's
tant today as it has ever been." IL, reprintedin 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv.at 1245. What connection? If the suggestion is, as it seems to be, that common-law nuisance has historically
circumscribed the scope and limit of the police power, that is simply not so. See Euclid, 272
U.S. 365; Mugler, 123 U.S. 623; Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53.
31. Dean Prosser said, "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men and has been
applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked
in a pie." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).
32. The Supreme Court decision in Lucas adopts a verbally less constricting standard,
though what precisely the majority has in mind is not certain. The Court's test is this: "Any
limitation so severe (restricting all economically beneficial use of land] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. I shall discuss this formulation in my upcoming Essay.
It may be noted here that if the Court meant only to embrace the kind of problems that were
dealt with by traditional nuisance law, such as health and safety, such a formulation by definition excludes those interests that have been brought to light both by modem industrial activity
and by modem ecological knowledge, such as the preservation of species.
33. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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tract; even if he or she purchased that tract prior to the time the regulation was enacted; even if the justification for the law was to protect the
state against the burdens of disaster relief, to protect public waters
against potential contamination, or to protect uplands against storm
damage; and even if by no stretch of doctrine could it be called a common-law nuisance or nuisance-like or noxious.3 4
Perhaps the claim for some standard of a time past is to seek a test
of actual and consequential harm imposed beyond one's own property
domain; to give weight to expectations; and to discipline government
from simply transferring value, through regulatory action, from a disfavored A to a favored B. The purpose of the Takings Clause is to discipline government overreaching. But to adopt as the only permissible
form of regulation a standard of harm frozen in some past historic moment-such as "a nuisance at common law" rather than a nuisance, or a
serious harm, as perceived in 1989-is quite incomprehensible.
Any nuisance, when it was first recognized by a court or defined by
legislation, was by definition a departure from then-existing expectations
and an implementation of the values of the time. To hold to a standard
set in the past, paradoxically, is to accept a governmental judgment of
some past moment, while disdaining parallel governmental judgments
made today. Such a view must assume that the problems worthy of governmental regulation are essentially immutable, and have nothing to do
with shifting societal values. That is not the case. Once, playing ball on
Sundays was considered a public nuisance. In 1843 a bowling alley was
held to be a common-law nuisance in New York because it was
[a] useless establishment, wasting the time of the owner, tending to fasten his own idle habits on his family, and to draw the
34. Oddly enough, Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas, written several months after the debate for which this Essay was prepared, chose to use the earthquake fault example to illustrate
noncompensable modem regulation:
Nor [would] the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant [be entitled to compensation] when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.... The use of these properties for
what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and ... it was
open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background principles
of nuisance and property law explicit.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01. The opinion never describes or elucidates the "background principle" of illegality to which Justice Scalia refers, but the notion seems to be that the owner was
somehow on notice of a preexisting principle and thus could not have formed reasonable expectations. Perhaps the notion is that the form of harm can change under new technology or
new knowledge, and owners must bear that risk, but not the risk of changing values. That has
not been the law, as Mugler, 123 U.S. 623; Tanner v. Trustees of the Village, 5 Hill 121 (N.Y.
1843) and the Industrial Revolution cases all demonstrate. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas.
472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Lancey v. Clifford, 54 Me. 487 (1867).
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men and boys of the neighborhood into a bad moral atmosphere.., at best... a waste of time and money, followed by
the multiplication of paupers and rogues."
At one time-before the presence of modem artificial illuminationlandowners were limited in what they could build by the doctrine of "ancient lights," a restriction designed to permit a high level of natural light
to enter neighboring structures.3 6 Today, no such restriction is necessary
and that limitation on landowners has disappeared. 37 As a new solar
technology develops, the issue in modem form arises again. 38 The law of
property has always been shaped by and adapted to the problems of its
time.
Nor can any appropriate lines be drawn between uses wholly internal to one's land and those that create external harms. That may once
have seemed the crucial distinction, and doubtless it underlay many of
the intuitions that generated older nuisance and trespass law. Modem
ecological knowledge has gone a long way to undercut such distinctions.
The ecological truism that everything is connected to everything else
may be the most profound challenge ever presented to established notions of property. The reason is that every traditional theory of property
assumes rights within a bounded domain, where one can use, enjoy,
profit and exclude, but not adversely affect others within their separate
domains. No theory of property supposes a right to impose burdens on
others. 39 No fundamental claim of right in a distinct property can extend beyond that property's limits to other domains where others' rights
begin. Regulation prohibiting the infliction of harm beyond what one
owns, albeit only by uses within the physical limits of one's own domain,
cannot in theory take property away even if it makes the owned property
35. Tanner, 5 Hill at 128.

36. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (citing 1 AM. JUR. Adjoining Landowners § 49, at 533 (1936)).
37. See id at 359.
38. See CAL. Pun. RS. CODE §§ 25982-25985 (West 1986) (regulating placement of trees
and shrubs obstructing solar collectors); GAIL BOYER HAYES, SOLAR AccEss LAW 15-32

(1979) (outlining "when and why solar access protection may be needed").
39. It may be said that to speak of doing "harm" is just a self-fulfilling way of defining
conduct, and that the same conduct (or nonconduct) can be described as conferring a benefit
on others. This issue arose in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), in which there was a dispute in the United States Supreme Court about whether
tearing down a historic building was doing harm or whether a law prohibiting such action

compelled the owner to confer a public benefit by retaining its building as an amenity for
others to enjoy. This same distinction was to arise in the Supreme Court decision in the Lucas
case. I shall reserve comment on it for my upcoming Essay. The important point is that if
separate properties are in a state of mutual dependence, no basic property theory confers a
right in that mutuality on either one or the other of the owners.
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useless and thus worthless, unless somehow the right to intrude on the
domain of others is conceived as incorporated in a property right. I am
aware of no theory that has ever posited such an expansive notion of
property.
The real difficulty is that modem ecological theory has eroded the
notion of a bounded domain, often almost to the vanishing point. Many
things that a short time ago were thought entirely the business of a landowner within the confines of his or her own land are now revealed to be
intimately interconnected with other lands and with public resources that
have never been thought to belong to the owner of a given tract.
It was once thought that a farmer's application of pesticide was no
one's business but his or her own; and the same for filling and building on
swampy land, though we now know that such uses can contaminate adjacent public waterways that do not belong to the wetland owner. Filling
lands that are natural floodwater retention basins will cause enhanced
flooding on downstream lands. Lucas's case is one of this new genre
growing out of modem ecological knowledge. Indeed, one finding of the
South Carolina law was that coastal development created risks to adjacent waters and their marine species.'
Not many years ago we knew little about the impact of dune removal and foreshore development on other lands or the burdens they
imposed on the public domain. Prior to the modem ecological era, Lucas's claim would have seemed utterly reasonable: "I only want to build
a single residential dwelling on my own property; what less right than
that can I have, and still be thought to have property?" But modem
ecological knowledge of connections impels a rethinking of traditional
notions of the content of property rights. It sees not simply the construction of a house but the destruction of a dune system that has been the
source of protection for properties upland of the barrier beach. It sees
the desired construction as an act of destruction of an integral part of
other lands. In the same sense it sees traditional dredging and fillingthe conventional means by which houses were long built on swampy
lands-as the destruction of a crucial part of a marine ecosystem that
exists outside the swampland owner's domain, and that has never been
considered a part of his or her property to destroy.
By what theory of property, however grounded in natural rights,
can the owner of land have a right to fill in his or her tract if the consequence is to destroy the marine life in adjacent public waters that breed
in the landowner's naturally swampy lands? Taken to its extreme, the
40.

S.C. CODE ANN. §

48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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question is this: If chopping down the trees on privately owned tropical
forest lands will, indeed, lead to massive global harm, do those landowners have a compensable property right to destroy the world? This is the
stunningly novel question that the new ecology poses to traditional property law.
To be sure, it is not simply that we know more than we once did.
We also have different priorities, or at the least we have shifted priorities
in light of changed circumstances. It is not only that we know more than
we did about the filling of wetlands. It is also either that we are more
concerned about the impact on marine ecosystems than we were earlier
or that we have diminished the stocks of marine resources (and wildlife
and wilderness) so that what remains seems more valuable to us. No
doubt, both increased knowledge and different priorities are at play. The
important fact is that the range of acceptable uses has always been a
product of the societal goals and priorities of the time and has been in
flux to the extent that those goals and priorities have been in flux.
If proof is needed that change is a constant and the definition of
property is not, there is no better example than the time of the Industrial
Revolution, when uncompensated changes in the definition of property
rights were probably greater than in any other historic time. Traditional
landed interests felt enormous impositions as the landscape was transformed by railroads, factories, mines, mills and quarries.4 1
These changes in property use rights can be clearly traced through
the shifting rights of riparian owners in the waters appurtenant to their
land.4 2 In the pre-Industrial Era, when water was primarily an amenity
resource, the law of natural flow gave every landowner the right to continuance of historic flows in quantity and quality as they were wont to
flow in the state of nature. However, as industrial uses got underway, as
mine drainage diminished water quality and as mills changed flows, the
law changed from the right to maintain natural flow to a right only to
prevent "unreasonable" use, which meant a right to diminish both quality and flow to meet the needs of industrial development. The definition
of tolerable harm was fundamentally revised.4"
41. See, e.g., Baird v. Williamson, 143 Eng. Rep. 831 (C.P. 1863) (holding that miner can
do what is necessary to get mineral out of ground even though doing so creates damaging flows
onto adjoining mine).
42. The historic evolution of riparian rights is traced in JOSEPH L. SAX, ROBERT H.
ABRAMS & BARTON THOMPSON, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 69-127 (1991).

Changing concepts of navigability reveal a parallel pattern. See Lancey v. Clifford, 54 Me.
487, 491-92 (1867).
43. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
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Similarly, when timber production required it, riparian rights were
reexamined. The public easement of commercial navigation was redefined to the detriment of riparian owners, from ships to log floating,' for
that was the only practical way to get timber to market. When the
American West was settled, yet another doctrinal turn was taken. In
most of the arid states, riparian rights were abolished entirely in favor of
rights of prior appropriation, again to promote and facilitate economic
development. This is the real "historical connection between the law of
nuisance and the proper scope of the police power."4 5 Today, as concern
about maintenance and restoration of fisheries rises, natural flow is having a revival and rules are again being changed to permit the acquisition
of instream flow rights.
It may be urged that changes such as those that occurred in the
redefinition of riparian rights may be allowed, but that they should only
be done with compensation. That is, existing permissible uses should not
be made impermissible in the absence of compensation, otherwise expectations will be disappointed. This has not traditionally been the law, as
the preceding examples make clear. But the question is serious and worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, I think it is among the most interesting and most profound questions raised by the takings issue. Why not
impose the economic burden of change of all kinds-whether brought
about by technological advance, new knowledge, new social values, or
changed circumstances-on the public, rather than on individuals who
happen to be in the way of change? Whatever the nature of social transformation in a given era, the individual owner cannot be expected to anticipate it. The new environmental consciousness and knowledge was no
more amenable to foresight than the invention of the airplane, or the
discovery of DNA.
Again the Industrial Revolution provides a useful setting in which
to consider the issue. If all the preexisting property owners-largely the
landed gentry-had been viewed as having compensable property rights
in the uses they had, the cost of achieving industrialization would have
been multiplied enormously." Exactly how much this would have constrained the process of industrialization has not been calculated, but it
44. Lancey, 54 Me. at 489-90.
45. Brief for the Institute of Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), reprintedin 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
at 1245.
46. Of course enormous costs were borne to achieve industrialization, but they were distributed in a way-as by rigorous working conditions and low wages-that promoted rather
than retarded change. Parallel distributional choices-in the sense of retarding or expediting
desired changes-are presented today in the environmental context.
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would no doubt have been enough to affect markedly the rate of change.
The compensation question is often discussed as if it had no impact on
the possibility of change or the rate of change, but that is certainly not
the case.
The example of industrialization suggests that the realistic possibility of change may be tied to whether compensation must be paid. It may
well be that the new use is more valuable than the old, but the amount
that the new use must pay to compensate, which determines the profitability and attractiveness of the new use, may be crucial. Surely, it would
have made a considerable difference if those who used the automobile
had to compensate all those who depended on horses; or if the supermarket could only come into being upon paying off the mom and pop industry that it largely replaced.
All this is to say that treatment of the compensation question reveals, as much as anything, a society's attitude about change. The more
that existing uses are granted status as compensable property rights, the
less likely it is that change will be seen as desirable. I do not urge that
change, per se, is either a good or a bad thing; obviously it can be either
desirable or undesirable. I only say that the way property is defined does
more to describe attitudes about change than it does to reveal some inherent quality of concepts like "nuisance" or "expectations."
How does a society, which is congenial to change, and which has a
limited view of compensable property rights, expect those in the path of
change to behave? I suspect the answer is that such societies put a high
value on human adaptiveness. Those who are most adaptive will accommodate change most easily and least painfully. The displaced landed gentry are expected to find their place in a new, industrialized world; the
denizens of agricultural village life are expected to learn to live in an
urbanizing world. There comes a time when people can no longer rely
on child labor, or indentured servants, or assert a right to be insulated
from the inevitable impacts of coal mines or nearby railroads.
In a more modern sense, businesses learn how to thrive in an atmosphere of taxes and regulation, and those that have lived under regulation
may have to re-adapt when deregulation becomes the order of the day.
In our own day, similarly, there are those who find themselves in possession of fragile lands, asbestos mines and asbestos-laden buildings, or
waste sites now known to be contaminating ground water aquifers. All
such people are, in a sense, the victims of a changing world. If societal
rules put a premium on adaptability, the most adaptive owners will lose
the least. Of course some loss is irreducible; not every lemon can be
turned to lemonade. However, there are many kinds of adaptiveness.
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For landowners, two obvious adaptive strategies are diversification and
timely disinvestment. I shall end with a last look at Lucas from the perspective of a world that accepts change as normal, and that values adaptive behavior.
Public legislation aimed at control of destructive development in the
coastal zone has been a prominent item on the national agenda at least
since 1972, when the first federal Coastal Zone Management Act4 7 was
enacted.4 8 Public regulation of development in areas subject to flooding
goes back nearly thirty years, to the early 1960s. 49 Wetlands regulation
has been a familiar feature of state law and prominent for mostly unsuccessful claims of interference with property rights, for more than two
decades." South Carolina itself has had a coastal zone management law
since 1977.1 That legislation's goal was protection of the beach/dune
system as its goal, though it was largely ineffective in its earlier forms.5 2
Lucas himself had been associated since 1979 with developmental activity on the Isle of Palms, during a period when the island suffered serious
erosion problems.
How should experienced and sophisticated investors in land behave
in 1986, in light of such a history? Is it prudent to assume that the decades-long history of increasing regulation will cease to increase? Is barrier island development a judicious place to invest large sums of otherthan-speculative money? Would discerning and adaptive investors usually opt to diversify out of this sort of land investment? Has the market
been giving disinvestment signals for years and years? Who but an individual determined to ignore the changes going on around him or her
would lay out so much money in 1986 for beach property on a barrier
island like the Isle of Palms?

47. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988)).
48. Respondent's Brief at 28-29, Lucas (No. 91-453).
49. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770, 771 (Conn. 1964);
see Joseph L. Sax, Takings; Private Propertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 & n.4
(1971).
50. See, eg., MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970); see Sax,
supra note 49, at 159 n.28, 159-60.
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. Respondent's Brief at 34, Lucas (No. 91-453).
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